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A stra t 
The paper seeks to interpret the uni ue nature of the Central European region as a 
borderland of the Western society of states, a status which developed throughout history 
but crystallized most clearly as a result of the Versailles peace treaties. We track this 
process through understanding the specific route of Central European state formation by 
 uxtaposing the impact of two key periods of early modern intellectual evolution on the 
region. Pointing to the belatedness of absolutistic centralisation and the timely arrival of 
nationalism in Central Europe, we show how the latter dismantled the more 
heterogeneous and centralised states of the region. Following this, the conse uences of 
the Versailles Treaties are evaluated with a focus on the self-perceived image of the new 
countries and the role of intellectuals.   
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The peace treaties of Versailles represented the beginning of the modern history of 
Central Europe. At the end of World War I, the multi-ethnic empires of the region 
dissolved, paving the way for the emergence of small nation-states. Nonetheless, due to 
the differences between the Western and Central European political and social reality, the 
political communities of the region have not fully integrated into the Western 
international society – they seemingly mirrored its fundamental institutions but with very 
different internal dynamics. Thus, retrospectively, the main legacy of Versailles is the 
creation of the fragmented Central European borderland, consisting of small states.  
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The concept of borderlands is a  uite complex and multi-layered one. It represents 
a social space in “a given territory (...) permanently populated by the representatives of 
two or more social groups, which are having distinctive, separate cultures of their own or 
their autonomous parts, which are most of all treated as separate in the social 
consciousness” (Sadowski, 2009:   ). Due to the spatial closeness of at least one 
boundary, the political and social relations of borderlands are shaped excessively by the 
existence of such borders (be they of any nature), albeit not necessarily in a conflictual 
way. Naturally, borderlands exist in all countries – in the framework of this study, based 
on Sadowski’s approach, we will refer to Central Europe as a civilisational borderland or 
systemic borderland, namely as a region of “historically changing” nature, “located 
between the discussed civilizations’ territory with a specific concentration of historical, 
ethnic, religious, political, language and other borders. These borders constitute an active 
cultural “e uipment” of the  inhabitants (being a component of the contemporary 
consciousness and the social memory of the inhabitants of the given territory)  and help 
to realize the social processes of inclusion and exclusion” (Sadowski, 2009:   ).  
Based on this definition, one can argue that Central Europe is clearly a 
civilisational borderland of the Western political and cultural community, standing 
between the core area of the West on the one hand and Orthodox civilisation and the 
former Ottoman sphere on the other. In this sense, its peoples find themselves in a rather 
uni ue situation, characterised by relative weakness, between ma or powers, political 
belonging to the West but without a complete integration into its political and cultural 
space. The article has two goals – firstly, to describe the historical processes which led to 
the establishment of this borderland, in which Versailles represented a cornerstone, and 
secondly to outline the basic nature of the Central European borderland. 
The perception of the borderland status (both inside and outside of the region) has 
been heavily shaped by the differences of size between Western and Eastern European 
countries, where we understand “size” as a comprehensive measure of assets (such as 
territory), capacities and capabilities altoget er. Even though small states also exist in 
Western Europe, the region is characterised by states of comparatively greater territory, 
population, economic output and military capabilities, while comparable big states are 
rather exceptions to the rule in Central Europe. We will try to detect some of the reasons 
for the birth of the small states of Central Europe by  uxtaposing the ways in which two 
ma or streams of modernity have influenced this region compared to Western Europe. To 
that end, we need to look at two key periods of the formation of modern European nation-
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states, those of Classical Europe and the Enlightenment. The former contributed to the 
birth of modern Westphalian statehood in the 1 th century, while the latter triggered the 
awakening of nations in the 1 th century and the rise of nationalism in the 19th century. 
We will attempt to identify the extent to which these periods and their streams of thought 
influenced the Central European region. 
 
Classi al  uro e 
If we were to draw a circle centred around Paris with a radius of 1,000 kilometres we 
would get the geographic reach of Classical Europe according to Pierre Chaunu (Chaunu, 
19  : 2 9). Classical Europe signifies the period around the 1 th and early 1 th centuries 
when the preconditions of the Enlightenment were created. It is a period of unheard-of 
social and scientific progress. It is characterised by Philippe Ari s as the era when when 
socially active roles were prolonged into an older age thanks to the growing relevance of 
intellectual work (Ari s, 19  : 19-  1), with physical work no longer being the 
exclusive way of personally contributing to society. New technological achievements 
certainly resulted in a significant increase in the  uality of life and, as a conse uence, also 
in a positive change of average life expectancy. In terms of academic achievements, it is 
worth noting that Chaunu found the period of classical Europe comparable only to the 
period of  th century BC and the years between 1 9  (Max Planck’s   anta) and 191  
(Einstein’s general theory of relativity). The academic pinnacle of classical Europe is best 
reflected by Descartes’  i  o r  de la mét ode and Newton’s Prin i ia P ilo o  iae. 
Written in 1    and 1   , respectively, these works provided the basis for modern 
academic thought (Chaunu, 19  : 22). Knowledge production would be fundamentally 
transformed as a result of these works within the sphere of Classical Europe, and this 
would pose a significant long-term challenge of catching up for the regions missing out 
on this development at the time.  
Classical Europe gave birth to academies of sciences, stock exchanges and the 
modern concept of art. And, perhaps most important of all, ingredients of modern 
statehood all appeared during these decades. Schooling and obligatory military service 
were a ma or innovation of classical European absolutism. By moving a considerable 
share of the population from one part of the country to another with the introduction of 
universal conscription, the classical state put its society on the track of homogenisation. 
We are talking of an era when the efficiency of the state reached unprecedented levels 
and when what we call Westphalian international order was gradually taking shape. 
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It is not irrelevant therefore to take a closer look at how Western and Central 
Europe related to the civilization of classical Europe because, as we will see, those 
countries where the state started the process of absolutistic centralisation belatedly would 
have to face the awakening of nations as a threat to their territorial integrity. In terms of 
the region in our focus, an ambiguous picture emerges. While some parts of Central 
Europe, such as Bohemia or today’s territory of Slovenia, clearly fall within the circle 
drawn by Chaunu, others found themselves outside of it. The best indicator of the borders 
of classical Europe is the time distance function. While the function measured from Paris 
remains linear between  0 and 1,000 kilometres, it bends in the shape of a parabola above 
1,000 kilometres. From thereon, adding but  00 kilometres essentially means the 
doubling of travelling time. Thus, in terms of time, the  ourney between Paris and Cádiz 
is e ual to two such  ourneys travelling from Paris to Madrid  Paris–Messina 
corresponded to two  ourneys from Paris to Rome while one Paris–Buda trip e ualled two 
Paris–Vienna  ourneys (Chaunu, 19  :2 9).2 This law considerably influenced the flow 
of people, goods, inventions and above all, ideas. It is no wonder therefore that the 
concept of modern statehood and its earliest manifestation in the form of absolutism were 
so fre uent within that circle and so rare outside of it in the 1 th century.  
At the time when absolutistic state design swept across Europe from France to 
Spain and the German principalities, the two ma or historical states of Central Europe 
went mostly untouched by this trend. In Perry Anderson’s words, Poland provided “a 
graphic a  ontrario demonstration of the historical rationality of Absolutism” (Anderson, 
19 9: 2 9). Poland was perhaps the only country of Europe that avoided absolutism not 
simply by abstaining from centralisation but by downright creating the first territorial 
republic of modern Europe. Within such frameworks, aristocratic individualism and the 
li er m  eto  ointly contributed to the partition of Poland which,  uxtaposed to the rise of 
Prussian absolutism, amounts to a fitting illustration of the borders of Classical Europe 
(Anderson, 19 9:2 9-29 ). Hungary was  ust becoming freed from Ottoman occupation 
towards the end of the period of Classical Europe and therefore the appearance of 
absolutistic statecraft was also belated there. In both of these places a moderated but 
foreign-imposed (by Russia and Austria, respectively) enlightened absolutism came into 
 
2 In fact, Chaunu mistakenly wrote Budapest  instead of Buda, but his point is clear:   oi de la di tan e 
a o tée  de           kilometre   la  on tion tem   di tan e e t  to te    o e  étant égale   en  ait  elle ne 
le  ont  amai   linéaire     del   la droite   in  r e   r le  a  en  orme de  ara ole    o ter     kilometre  
       kilometre     e t do  ler en gro  le tem   de  ar o r     Pari   adi      Pari  Madrid    Pari  
Me  ine     Pari   ome    Pari  B da e t     Pari   ienne ” 
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being in the 1 th century. Enlightenment thus started to influence the region without the 
stable basis of classical independent statecraft.   
 
 nli  ten ent   o ernisation an  nationalis  
Pierre Chaunu used a different borderline when he identified the Eastern limits of 
enlightened Europe in his  a  i ili ation de l   ro e de  l mi re . Enlightened Europe 
was to be found to the West of the line connecting the Baltic and the Black Seas. That 
was the area where 90 or 9  percent of the society would have birth, marriage and death 
certificates already between 1  0 and 1  0 (Chaunu, 19 1:11 ). It is worth noting that 
while the civilization of classical Europe only featured some territories of Central Europe, 
Enlightenment seems to have affected most of it. The most spectacular illustration of 
Enlightenment could be the growing relevance of literacy, which made linguistic reform 
an important vehicle of national identity-building. The transformative power of literacy 
and philology brought to life a horizontal form of consciousness, that of the modern nation 
(Geary, 201 :  - 9).  In Anthony D. Smith’s view, the term  nationalism’, with its 
modern connotation, can be traced back to the work of one of the most influential German 
enlightened philosophers, Herder, but it spread onward only in the 19th century (Smith, 
19  :1  ). This time Central Europe was not lagging behind and was simultaneously 
influenced by the rise of the new ideology, as reflected by the waves of linguistic reforms 
and the awakening of nations in the 1 th and 19th centuries (Geary, 201 :  - 9).  
The size of modern European states was also shaped by modernisation and 
nationalism. “Pressures and constraints of development”, argues Thomas Nairn 
(199 :1  ) “ensured that only entities above a certain threshold of scale” had the ability 
to survive in the anarchic interstate environment. The optimal model for the new era was 
that of France, surpassing the “confines of the city-state” and the “bureaucratic hierarchies 
of the ancient empire-state” (ibid: 1  ), because it was “capable of constructing a 
distinguishable political economy of its own, the range of cultural and administrative 
institutions needed for managing this, and an army capable of defending it” (ibid: 1  ). 
Thus, the heritage of modernisation and nationalism includes the comparatively big states 
of Western Europe.  
 
 
 
  Geary treats here modern philology as a root cause of the idea of the homogenous nation-state. 
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 ra  entation 
As we have seen, Central Europe was not an integral part of Classical Europe and thus it 
was only partially affected by modern absolutism in the 1 th century. However, it was 
almost fully integrated into enlightened Europe, and therefore the ideology of nationalism 
arrived on time in the 1 th and 19th centuries. The region had to face the temptations of 
national awakening without the long-term unifying and homogenising impact of 
absolutistic statecraft. While the various regions of France, the cities and the countryside 
could speak the same literary language by the 19th century when nationalism hit in, 
Central Europe could be characterised by multilingual, multi-ethnic and fragmented 
societies where cities, the countryside and various regions of the state spoke different 
languages up until the early 20th century  (Geary, 201 : 2-  ). 
It was this state of affairs in which the countries of the region had to deal with the 
awakening of nations. Nationalism preceding independent modern statehood resulted in 
national communities built up on the basis of linguistic and ethnic differences, not on 
political or economic realities (Bib , 2011), creating a fractured mosaic in the region. It 
is hardly surprising, therefore, that with the rise of the principle of the self-determination 
of peoples, World War I left behind much fragmentation in this region where 
homogenisation and consolidation of the nation-states could only take place on smaller 
territories.  
 
  e le a   of  ersailles an  t e esta lis  ent of t e Central  uro ean  or erlan  
As a result of the above-mentioned circumstances in Central Europe, the creation of a 
comprehensive state system based on respect for demands of self-determination was 
unimaginable at the end of World War I. Allied powers did arrive at the same conclusion, 
and they did not in fact seek to set this impossible norm for the newly created “nations.” 
Poland was the first territory where national self-determination was designated as a 
fundamental norm to be respected (Halecki, 19 2:  9 ). In the case of the peoples of 
Austria-Hungary, President Wilson himself supported solely the “the freest opportunity 
of autonomous development” (Halecki, 19 2:  99). Even in the case of the Russian 
empire, the U.S. administration did not push for the self-determination of all nations. 
Naturally, the different treatment was a result of geopolitical considerations.  
 
  This only changed with the deportations of the 20th century.  
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It was not only the creation of the Versailles system which (re)produced the 
Central European borderland, but many other historical developments also contributed to 
its emergence – first and foremost the establishment of communist regimes in the region 
without a complete integration into the Soviet Union. However, the Versailles system was 
historically the first ma or step in constructing Central Europe as a politically separate 
spatial unit. While the peace treaties formally integrated Central European states into the 
European state system, many of their conse uences had long-lasting effects which shape 
regional politics even today.  
First, Central Europe became a region of small states which are painfully aware 
of their size. While Versailles provided independence for many of Central Europe’s 
nations, it deprived them of the security architecture offered by the Austro-Hungarian 
Monarchy. The ideas of Czech historian Franti ek Palack  summarise the situation 
perfectly – he argued that the Monarchy should not have been abolished since it protected 
Central European nations from the “hegemony of great powers” (Kazharski, 2019: )  
rather, it should have been internally reformed. As a result, the legacy of Versailles is not 
 ust national independence but also a sense of exposure and weakness. In the words of 
Tomá  Masaryk, “we must bear in mind, that we are a small people in an unfavourable 
geographical position” (i id). 
The second legacy of the peace treaties is that the notions of “nation” and 
“territoriality”, as cornerstones of the Westphalian international system, were attributed 
a different meaning in the region, which impacts on geopolitical and foreign policy 
thinking to this day. After Versailles, the borders between states and nations do not 
overlap,  uestioning the basic functioning of “nation-states”. Many communities found 
themselves in the “wrong state”, namely where the ma ority represents a different 
political-ethnic group (Roter, 2012:1  ), a status which they did not manage to accept. 
As a result, the official boundaries of countries are perceived to have a “variable 
geometry” (Babeti cited by Nikiforova, 2012:10 ), which means that they are more 
imaginary and less solid, and they are constantly in the process of reconstruction in 
response to the changes of the historical and political context (Nikiforova 2012:10 ). 
Moreover, due to this mosaic of national communities being present in almost each state, 
nation-building has often contradicted democratic norms (Drulák, 2012:  1), leading to a 
more exclusive interpretation of nationalism.   
Thirdly, state identities in Central Europe developed in a very diverse manner. 
According to Petra Roter (2012: 1  ), “some have unfulfilled ambitions (Poland), some 
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are traumatized by their losses (Hungary), and others suffer from historical inferiority 
complexes and fears (Slovakia and the Czech Republic  and Slovenia )”. Differences in 
identity also include the altered perception of one’s own size or the interpretation of core-
periphery relations in Europe (Kazharski, 2019). This not only complicates interstate 
relations, but also makes foreign policy in the region less predictable, more diverse and 
less suitable for analysis using (only) Western IR theories as a framework.  
Fourth, this being a point relevant specifically to Hungary’s case, Versailles 
strengthened the uni ue experience and identity of the Hungarian political elite. From a 
comparative point of view, the Treaty of Trianon (which set the modern borders of 
Hungary) with all its controversies did not really constitute such an unambiguous case of 
mistreatment as it is often argued in Hungary. Almost all of the communities concerned 
perceived at least some of the newly created borders as un ust. The particularity of the 
Hungarian experience derived from the previously held strong position in the Austro-
Hungarian Empire, in what was formerly one of the largest states of Europe. In the system 
created by the 1    Compromise, the Hungarian elite participated in the foreign policy 
decision-making of the Empire. This was the environment in which the socialization of 
the elite took place. While “foreign policy was the prerogative of the emperor”, as S. 
Wank argues (19  :  1), it “had to be brought into harmony with the interests of both the 
Magyars  Hungarians  and the Germans”. Through narrow institutional and somewhat 
wider informal and personal ways, the Hungarian elite took part in forming the common 
foreign policy, even if it played a limited or inferior role in this respect (Szi árt , 199 ).  
The experience of participating in the foreign policy-making of a large empire was 
absent in the case of almost all of the newly created Central European nations.  On the 
eve of World War I, there was not even an independent nation-state besides Romania in 
the north of the Balkans. It is only from this perspective that we can understand the true 
effects of the Treaty of Trianon on Hungary – this impact entailed not only the loss of 
ethnic-Hungarian territories but also the loss of former grande r. As a result, the 
Hungarian elite and society have been struggling to deal with the difference between the 
actual and the desired (and remembered) size and power of the country (Szalai, 201 ).  
Fifth, Versailles strengthened the uni ueness of how knowledge production is 
conducted in Central Europe, especially in the social sciences (Drulák, 2012), which 
contributes to the reproduction of the alterations of the previously described uni ueness 
 
  The exception can be the Czech elite, which also participated in the monarchic foreign policy, although 
to a much narrower extent than Hungarians.  
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of the region. After the age of Enlightenment, Western societies differentiated between 
practitioners (in this case, politicians) on the one hand, and scientists on the other. The 
 ob of the latter was to monitor, evaluate and criticize practical developments. Even if 
they intervened in politics (as during the French revolution), they constructed separate 
intellectual spheres. Central Europe was touched by the evolution of Western-style 
modern science already in the 19th century, but went through a clear transformation in 
this respect. Due to the political and social realities of the region (especially the imperial 
system, the small size of national elites and the belated nation-building efforts), there was 
no clear line separating intellectuals and scientists as the latter group had to play a 
prominent role in their national communities. Moreover, as a result of the newly created 
states, post-Versailles, “the agenda of the intellectual idiom became much larger in the 
East as it not only reformed the state institutions but actually rebuilt these institutions 
from scratch” (Drulák, 2012:20). Such tendencies were strengthened by the Communist 
era during which the sciences were completely under state control. The result has been a 
more political and politically dependent scientific elite which is deeply embedded into 
state institutions and dependent on them for funding.  
 
 
Con lusion 
We attempted to uncover the role of Versailles in the formation of the Central European 
borderland. In doing so, we focused first on the rise of small states and explained it 
through the region’s shifting place and character in two key periods of modern state 
formation, those of Classical Europe and the Enlightenment.Belatedness in absorbing 
absolutistic statecraft relative to Western Europe, and the appearance of nationalism 
simultaneously with its rise in the West, were interpreted as two determinants of the birth 
of Central European small states. With its uni ue historical development and political 
norms, the region produced a particular Central European IR political culture. The 
definitive attributes of this culture include the perception of smallness and weakness, the 
alterations of the norms of territoriality and nationhood, diverging state identities, and 
altered ways of knowledge production, all of which still effect political thinking in Central 
European countries. Versailles did not create the uni ueness of Central Europe but – by 
spreading the modern state system into the region without abolishing existing normative 
differences – it did construct the Central European borderland.   
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